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The main concern of stockholders who provide the firm with funding is a fair return on their 
investment. Conflicts of interest within the firm can threaten to reduce that return. In particular, 
small stockholders may worry that large stockholders will use their control rights to increase 
private benefits and finance it with reduced dividends. The incentive to do this comes from the 
fact that the controlling stockholder can appropriate private benefits in their entirety, while 
dividends must be shared proportionally with the minority. The literature calls this the majority-
minority problem (Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Shleifer and Vishny (1997)), the horizontal agency 
problem (Roe (1994)), and the second agency problem (Villalonga and Amit (2006)). Our study 
is the first to analyze the relationship between stockholder conflicts and dividend policy in a 
large sample of firms with concentrated ownership. These are the firms in which stockholder 
conflicts are likely to be particularly serious. 
Our key finding is that a higher potential for stockholder conflicts induces higher dividend 
payments. This is particularly true when the firm needs new minority investments at a later stage 
and when the minority is weak by being absent from the board and having diffuse equity stakes. 
These results hold regardless of how we measure dividend policy, minority investment, and 
conflict potential. Moreover, we observe these relationships in a legal regime with relatively 
strong protection of stockholder rights. This suggests that market mechanisms, such as a 
dividend policy that builds reputation for fair treatment of a minority that the majority will need 
later on, are important tools for reducing agency costs even under strong institutional discipline. 
The inability of dispersed stockholders to prevent managers from expropriating their wealth is 
the root of the first (vertical) agency problem (Roe (1994); Villalonga and Amit (2006)). The 
empirical literature has mostly focused on this conflict, probably due to the lack of data for firms 
where the second agency problem is the more serious (Demsetz and Lehn (1985); Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001)). The first agency problem dominates in public firms because stockholders are 
often dispersed. In contrast, high ownership concentration and even majority ownership is the 
rule in private firms, which are also subject to less demanding governance regulations and 
reporting requirements than public firms of similar size (Nagar et al. (2011)). To illustrate, the 
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average equity holding of the largest stockholder is 30% in public firms and 78% in private firms 
of similar size in Norway, where our sample firms come from. There is a majority stockholder in 
15% of the large public firms and in 69% of the large private firms (Bøhren (2011)). Thus, the 
potential conflict between the stockholders – rather than between stockholders and managers – is 
the more pressing agency problem for private firms, which constitute a large part of aggregate 
value creation in any economy. 1    
The lack of attention in the literature to the conflict between majority and minority stockholders 
may provide at least a partial explanation of the well-known “dividend puzzle”: In spite of the 
irrelevance theorem of Miller and Modigliani (1961), investors pay close attention to dividend 
policy, and firms distribute dividends even when they are at a tax disadvantage compared to 
capital gains (Lintner (1956), Black (1976), Allen and Michaely (2003), Brav et al. (2005), 
DeAngelo et al. (2008)). Our starting point is the idea that disbursing the firm’s free cash flow as 
dividends can reduce agency costs, since a smaller free cash flow produces a smaller funding 
source for private benefits (Jensen (1986)). Studying the link between payout and potential 
agency costs can therefore shed new light on the dividend puzzle. In particular, such an analysis 
may allow us to determine whether owners of controlling blocks typically behave 
opportunistically, or if they instead try to establish a reputation for fair treatment of their co-
investors. The literature calls these two very different payout policies the outcome model and the 
substitute model, respectively (La Porta et al. (2000), Cheffins (2006)). 
Our key to a valid test of these two alternative dividend theories is to focus on firms where one 
stockholder controls more than half the outstanding equity. Such majority owners have both 
strong incentives and sufficient power to monitor managers (Shleifer and Vishny (1986)). Thus, 
the impact of the first agency problem (stockholders vs. managers) on dividend payout is 
negligible in our sample. In contrast, controlling stockholders can influence the seriousness of 
                                                 
1 The OECD has recently recognized agency costs as a determinant of economic development. A special section of 
their Policy Framework for Investment document is devoted to this topic. The OECD notices that the “two types of 
conflict of interest in corporate governance, one between majority and minority shareholders and the other between 
management and shareholders.” (OECD (2006, 2011)). 
3 
 
the second agency problem (large vs. small stockholders) by their decision to retain or pay out 
the firm’s free cash flow. The relationship between the size of the majority block and the fraction 
of earnings paid out as dividends will reflect how stockholder conflicts play out in practice. 
The highest potential for stockholder conflicts is when the largest owner holds just above 50% of 
the equity. At that level, the majority stockholder controls the firm, enjoys the private benefits, 
but receives only about half the cash flow paid out as dividends. Thus, the incentive to use the 
firm’s resources to finance private benefits is high because the cost is low in terms of lost 
dividends. As the ownership stake increases, however, the majority’s share of lost dividends 
becomes larger, and the incentive to divert the firm’s cash for private benefits falls 
correspondingly. Hence, the closer the majority stake is to 100%, the more the majority 
internalizes the cost of the private benefits.  
The two alternative dividend theories have opposite predictions for how dividend payout varies 
with ownership concentration in majority-held firms. In the outcome model (opportunistic 
behavior), majority stockholders will divert more cash for private benefits and pay particularly 
low dividends when a large part of the lost payout would have been received by minority owners 
(i.e., around a 50% majority stake). Thus, dividends increase with increasing ownership 
concentration in the outcome model. In contrast, the majority stockholder in the substitute model 
(minority-friendly behavior) wants to create a reputation for not misusing his power, particularly 
when the potential stockholder conflict is large. Therefore, the expected relationship between 
dividend payout and the majority’s equity stake is negative or flat in the substitute model. Which 
of these two scenarios is the dominant one in practice is an empirical question. 
Our evidence supports the substitute model and refutes the outcome model. We find that firms 
with a higher potential for stockholder conflicts pay out a larger fraction of their earnings as 
dividends, particularly when they need new minority investments later on. While the average 
firm in our sample pays out 20% of its earnings as dividends, the payout ratio decreases by 7 
percentage points as the equity fraction of the firm’s largest owner increases from 50% to 99%. 
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This result also holds in family-controlled firms regardless of whether we measure conflict 
potential by ultimate ownership concentration at the individual, nuclear family or extended 
family level.2 Moreover, payout is higher when the minority is weak by not being present on the 
board or not having concentrated stakes. All in all, the observed dividend policy is consistent 
with the substitute model also when we account for more detailed characteristics of the potential 
stockholder conflict. 
These findings are independent of whether we measure payout by dividends per unit of earnings, 
cash flows, sales or assets. The results are also insensitive to whether we use the propensity to 
pay dividends or the fraction of earnings paid, and to whether we consider all firms or just those 
that pay dividends in a given year. Moreover, the findings persist when we use panel data 
techniques to account for unobservable payout determinants at the firm, industry, or aggregate 
economy level. Throughout our analysis, we control for a wide set of dividend determinants 
other than agency costs. Specifically, we account for the firm’s profitability, asset liquidity, 
financial constraints, growth opportunities, risk, size, and age. 
We examine possible reasons for the observed substitute pattern and find that firms with 
potentially more serious stockholder conflicts do not just pay more of their earnings as 
dividends. They also receive more subsequent equity investment from their minority 
stockholders. While one quarter of the firms with high conflict potential and high dividend 
payout receive minority investment, this happens in only one tenth of the firms with low conflict 
potential. These results suggest that dividend policy is an important tool for building favorable 
reputation, attracting new equity investment, and thus for reducing the firm’s agency costs.  
Our sample is particularly well suited for uncovering the relationship between stockholder 
conflicts and dividend policy. First, we choose a large sample from the population of all 
Norwegian private firms with a controlling stockholder. This clean sample with widely varying 
                                                 
2 The ultimate owners we identify are individuals, families, foreign entities, and institutional investors. Families are 
defined from family relationships up to the fourth degree of kinship. Nuclear families include only parents and 
underage children. 
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majority stakes increases the power of our test. Second, the detailed ownership data allows us to 
assign stockholders to families using alternative family definitions, to account for the 
composition of the minority stakes, and to capture how the board structure reflects the ownership 
structure. Compared to just measuring conflict potential by a standard ownership concentration 
measure such as the equity fraction of the largest individual owner, our richer set of ownership 
characteristics allows for deeper and more detailed insight into how stockholder conflicts and 
dividend policy interact. 
Finally, our sample comes from a regulatory regime with neutral dividend taxation. This setting 
implies that we can ignore the impact of taxes on dividends, as there are no incentives for 
stockholders to receive dividends rather than capital gains, salary or interest.3 Similarly, the role 
of dividends as a signal about future expected cash flow is moderate, since the sample firms are 
private, majority-controlled, and have three stockholders on average. Thus, dividend policy may 
rather be a tool for handling the free cash flow problem than a forecast of future earnings from 
informed insiders to uninformed outsiders.4  
Our findings are in line with previous results suggesting that the private benefits of control are 
low in countries with Scandinavian legal origin. Nenova (2003) reports a control premium of 
around 5% for Norway. This premium resembles estimates from other Scandinavian countries 
and in common law countries, but is below the average premium for countries with German 
(11%) and French (25%) civil law origin.  The impression of relatively low private benefits is 
confirmed by Dyck and Zingales (2004), who relate low control premiums to media pressure and 
effective tax enforcement. Norway has the highest newspaper readership in their sample of 69 
countries, and has also high tax compliance. Similarly, Holmén and Knopf (2004) find no 
                                                 
3 The tax reform preceding our sample period was explicitly designed to ensure the equivalence of all cash flows to 
investors regardless of their formal status (Sørensen (2005, 2007)). This property alleviates an important concern in 
our analysis, since the relatively small size and high ownership concentration of many private firms make it easier to 
shift between cash flows with different tax status. 
4 It may be argued that dividend signaling is not just for the current stockholders, but also for prospective ones. 
Nevertheless, the concentrated ownership structure and the lack of an active market for private firms’ shares suggest 
that signaling is not a key role for dividends in our sample firms. 
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evidence that controlling stockholders increase their wealth at the minority’s expense in Swedish 
mergers. We go one step further and show that the low control premium is also justified by the 
observed payout policy, which tends to mitigate rather than increase the potential agency conflict 
between large and small stockholders inherent in the firm’s ownership structure. 
Strong legal protection, well-informed investors, media pressure, and the threat of intervening 
tax authorities may all restrict the opportunity set for opportunistic behavior and hence 
rationalize our findings. Another possibility is, however, that majority stockholders would have 
chosen the observed dividend policy also in the absence of such regulation. The reason is that 
they anticipate the future need for additional equity investment by the minority. To reduce the 
cost of such future equity issues, the majority owner tries to establish a reputation for being fair. 
The carrot of easy access to capital thus balances the stick of a generous payout policy. Hence, it 
is in the majority’s self-interest to abstain from opportunistic behavior. We find evidence of such 
reputation concerns in our data. The positive relationship between payout ratios and potential 
agency costs is stronger in firms that require additional minority investment in subsequent years. 
The fact that we find reputation effects in a large sample of firms in a country with good investor 
protection points to the importance of governance mechanisms that are market-based and 
voluntary rather than institutional and mandatory. 
Our findings are consistent with those of Ostergaard and Smith (2011), who analyze a setting 
where governance regulation is left to private contract. The authors study the time period 1900-
1910, which is just before the adoption of the first Norwegian corporate law. Analyzing 
corporate charters in great detail, Ostergaard and Smith find the strongest protection of 
stockholder rights in the charter of firms with the largest potential agency conflicts. They also 
find that high dividend payout is used as a substitute for alternative ways of protecting the 
minority, such as a two-tiered board and a decreasing voting right per share as the block size 
increases. Similarly, Bøhren et al. (2012) find that Norwegian banks pay more of their earnings 
as dividends when the owners have weak control rights relative to other stakeholders. Once 
more, this evidence supports the substitute model. 
7 
 
Most extant studies of dividends and ownership have looked at owner types rather than owner 
conflicts. Domestic and foreign owners of public firms seem to have different dividend 
preferences (Dahlquist and Robertson (2001)). Institutional investors prefer dividend-paying 
companies, but not higher payout ratios (Grinstein and Michaely (2005)). Also, institutional 
investors are sensitive to their own stockholders’ tax brackets when choosing among firms with 
different dividend policies (Desai and Jin (2011)). Eckbo and Verma (1994) consider managers 
and institutional investors as examples of stockholders with different dividend preferences.  They 
find in their sample of Canadian firms that higher power for management is associated with 
lower dividends, which seems consistent with the outcome hypothesis.  
In a rare study that does consider stockholder conflicts, Faccio et al. (2001) find evidence that 
pyramids are used to expropriate minority stockholders in East Asian countries, but less so in 
Western Europe. We have little to say about pyramiding, since such control structures are rare in 
our sample. Instead, we focus on firms which are not part of business groups, and we exploit the 
variability in the cash flow rights of the controlling stockholder. This setting allows us to make a 
clean test based on a large sample of firms that have a clearly defined controlling stockholder. 
The tax regime is stable and neutral over the sample period, and all firms are exposed to the 
same legal protection of stockholder rights.   
The literature on payout policy in private firms is recent and very limited. Michaely and Roberts 
(2012) use a large sample of private and public UK firms and find that the dividend payments of 
private firms are less smoothed. Moreover, firms with sole or family ownership pay dividends 
that are close to the residual dividend predicted by the irrelevance theory of Miller and 
Modigliani (1961). Michaely and Roberts conclude that “ownership structure and incentives play 
key roles in shaping dividend policies”. We provide strong evidence in support of this view. 
Finally, La Porta et al. (2000) find that dividend payout is higher in countries with good 
protection of minority stockholders. This result is in line with the outcome model and suggests 
that a certain degree of legal protection is needed to ensure that minority investors get a 
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satisfactory share of the firm’s cash flow. In contrast, we study a cross section of firms in just 
one country, and that country has strong legal stockholder rights and good enforcement.5 We 
find that controlling stockholders do not restrict payout to the minority when doing so would 
produce particularly large opportunities for consuming private benefits. This finding suggests 
that once basic requirements for the protection of minority stockholder rights are met in the law, 
controlling stockholders find it in their best interest to voluntarily abstain from opportunistic 
behavior. However, the contrast between their results and ours is not simply due to a favorable 
institutional regime, since we find that reputation concerns play a significant role in our sample 
firms. Because not every contingency can be dealt with by regulation and private contract, our 
results suggest there is also a role for informal mechanisms such as reputation. 
The remaining part of our paper is organized as follows. The data set and the sample selection 
procedure are described in section I, whereas section II establishes the base-case model, defines 
the empirical proxies, and reports summary statistics. The statistical tests for the base case are 
presented in section III, while section IV reports robustness tests. Section V examines the 
evidence on reputation effects, while section VI concludes. 
 
I. Data and sample selection 
Out data set is based on the population of Norwegian firms with limited liability. The data 
quality is unusually high, as the law mandates a standardized set of full accounting statements 
certified by a public auditor for every firm regardless of its listing status, size, and industry. 
Failure to submit this information within 17 months after fiscal year-end triggers automatic 
                                                 
5 La Porta et al. (2000) find that investor protection inherent in the commercial law is on average strongest in 
common law countries and weakest under civil law of the French type. The German and the Scandinavian civil law 
traditions fall in between. Based on seven stockholder right characteristics, Norway gets the highest score of the 
Scandinavian countries and the highest average score on the rule of law, including the maximum score on 
enforcement. Spamann (2010) corrects and reestimates the La Porta et al. index, finding that the original estimates 
and the corrected index scores only have a correlation coefficient of 0.53. Nevertheless, Norway’s score is identical 
under the original and the corrected index, the score under the corrected index is practically equal to the average 
corrected score for common law countries, and all Scandinavian countries receive the same corrected score. 
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liquidation by the court. We know every ultimate ownership stake (i.e., direct stake plus indirect 
stake through intermediaries) in every firm. The data includes family relationship by blood and 
marriage between all owners, directors, and the CEO.6 
Our starting point when selecting the sample is the population of private firms with limited 
liability.7 To obtain a sample that suits our purpose, we add the following sampling filters: 
1. Financial firms are excluded to avoid the impact of their regulatory capital requirements and 
special accounting rules. We also exclude utilities and public administration firms. These 
filters are common in the payout policy literature (Grullon and Michaely (2002), Allen and 
Michaely (2003),  DeAngelo et al. (2006)). 
2. We ignore subsidiaries in business groups, since subsidiaries may pay dividends for different 
reasons than those determining payout to non-parent stockholders. For instance, dividends 
may be paid to manage cash and risk for the group as a whole (Michaely and Roberts 
(2012)). Moreover, expropriation within business groups has already been examined by 
Faccio et al. (2001) based on data from East Asia and Western Europe.8 
3. To avoid non-operative firms, a sample firm must have positive sales, assets, and 
employment. 
4. The firm must have consistent accounting statements. For instance, total assets need to equal 
total liabilities plus stockholders’ equity. 
5. There must be a majority owner. This means more than 50% of the share capital must be held 
by a family with one or more stockholders, or by a firm whose owners cannot be identified.9 
Since our database includes all firms in the economy, we can follow ownership chains and 
                                                 
6Accounting, ownership, and board data are delivered by Experian (www.experian.no). Data on family relationships 
are from Skattedirektoratet. All data items have been received in electronic form and are organized as one integrated 
database by the Centre for Corporate Governance Research (www.bi.edu/ccgr). 
7Since listing status may matter for the firm’s dividend policy, for instance via an easier access to equity markets, 
we exclude public firms from the sample. However, adding the very few public firms with concentrated ownership 
does not change our results. 
8Unlike in countries like Sweden, multiple-class stock is rare in Norway (Ødegaard (2007), Eklund (2009), 
Ikäheimo (2011)). 
9Such unidentified owners are either a financial institution, a foreign firm or a foreign person. Since we do not know 
the identity of foreign investors, we can neither trace their ultimate ownership nor assign them to families. 
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base the majority filter on ultimate ownership.10 We also use the ultimate dividend, since our 
concern is the total payout the stockholder receives from a firm, whether directly or 
indirectly through intermediaries.  
6. Single-owner firms are excluded, since they have no stockholder conflicts. For similar 
reasons, we ignore the smallest 5% of the firms by assets, sales, and employment. 
We are interested in the potential conflict between majority and minority stockholders, studying 
how the majority chooses to share or not to share the firm’s cash flow with the minority. 
Therefore, we use a sample of firms where the controlling block can be easily identified.11 Our 
tests are based on keeping control of the firm constant while exploiting the variation in how the 
residual cash flow rights are split between the majority and the minority. To maintain this focus, 
we do not pay particular attention to blockholders unless they hold a majority stake, and we 
ignore potential blockholder coalitions in the spirit of Laeven and Levine (2008). Instead, the 
coalition we deal with is the easily identifiable one based on family relationships.  
A firm’s dividend policy may reflect other concerns than agency costs, such as financial 
constraints, profitability, and taxes. Our regression models account for such determinants by a 
series of control variables. The exception is tax concerns, which are better handled by the 
sampling procedure. In particular, we focus on the dividend payments based on accounting 
statements for 2006-2010. This period is shortly after a tax reform which eliminated a serious tax 
distortion of dividend policy.12 The tax reform produced the same effective tax rate on dividend 
                                                 
10The ultimate owner is very often an individual or a family. Therefore, running our tests just on family firms 
produces results that are similar to those we report. Our main results also hold in the subsample of firms controlled 
by financial institutions or foreigners. 
11Given our filters, control is achieved either through owning stock directly or through an investment company 
without other economic activities. 
12The tax reform had its first effect on dividends for the accounting year 2005, and dividends for that year were paid 
in 2006. Nevertheless, we exclude the accounting year 2005, since we are interested in the post-reform equilibrium 
rather than temporary tax reform effects. Dividend payments are quite high in the year prior to the tax reform and 
quite low the year after, indicating a shift of cash outflows to preempt the tax increase inherent in the reform. 
Nevertheless, including 2005 in our sample does not significantly change the results. This suggests that even strong 
tax incentives do not wipe out the effect of agency costs on dividend payout. 
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income, capital gains, and interest income, and the tax rate is also very close to the one on labor 
income. Hence, differences in dividend policy across our sample firms cannot be driven by taxes. 
Applying these filters, we end up with a sample of 8,744-10,185 firms per year. Table 1 shows 
the details. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
II. Model, empirical proxies, and summary statistics 
The basic question we want to explore is whether higher cash flow rights for the controlling 
stockholder induce higher or lower dividend payout. Our base-case model is the following: 
(1) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7it it it it it it it it itDiv Con Liq Pro Fin Risk Size Ageα β β β β β β β= + + + + + + + +ψ  
The measure of dividend payout, Div, is the ratio of cash dividends to after-tax operating 
earnings. This is the classic dividend payout ratio, which we use when testing the base-case 
model in section III. However, majority stockholders may choose to underreport earnings and 
hence inflate the classic payout ratio in order to hide cash diversion from minority stockholders. 
To reduce this bias, the robustness tests in section IV alternatively measure Div by the ratio of 
dividends to cash flows, sales, and assets. The approach is similar to the one used by La Porta et 
al. (2000) and Faccio et al. (2001). 
Ownership concentration, Con, which is the key independent variable in our model. Con reflects 
the potential seriousness of the stockholder conflict in majority-controlled firms, and we measure 
it in the base case as the ultimate share held directly or indirectly by the largest owning entity. 
This entity may be a family, a native financial institution or a foreign investor of any type. A 
family consists of either a single individual or several individuals related by blood or marriage 
who all own stock in the firm. We use two alternative family definitions. The wide definition in 
the base case includes individuals related by blood or marriage up to the fourth degree of kinship 
(family). The more restricted definition only includes parents and underage children (nuclear 
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family). A final proxy for Con is the holding of the largest separate owning unit. Unlike for the 
family-based definitions, every individual in the family is considered a separate owner. Since the 
potential agency cost decreases with Con in our sample, the predicted coefficient 1β  in (1) is 
positive under the outcome model. According to the substitute model, 1β is non-positive, i.e., 
negative or zero. 
We subsequently expand the base-case model by ownership characteristics beyond Con. In 
particular, we account for the distribution of ownership within the largest family, and for 
minority power as reflected in the composition of the minority stakes and the minority’ presence 
in the board. Minority power and dividend payout will be positively related under the outcome 
model and inversely under the substitute model. 
The remaining determinants in (1) are control variables. Firms with more liquid assets, Liq, are 
more likely to pay higher dividends. This is because such firms can make the payment at lower 
transaction costs than others, and because they may have more cash on hand than what is needed 
for operations, investment, and financing (DeAngelo et al. (2006)). Along the same lines, firms 
with higher profitability, Pro, may be more likely to pay out a larger share of their earnings. 
Therefore, we predict a positive coefficient for both Liq and Pro, which are proxied for by the 
cash-to-assets ratio and the operating return on assets, respectively. 
Fin reflects constraints on the firm’s ability to finance its cash outflow. This constraint may 
restrict dividend payments more the higher the firm’s growth prospects. For a given level of 
profitability and asset liquidity, we predict a negative relationship between dividends and Fin, 
which we measure by sales growth over the past seven years. 
It has long been argued that firms pay dividends from what they consider their permanent 
earnings (Lintner (1956)). Therefore, firms with more risky earnings will be less likely to pay 
high dividends. This logic is also consistent with the maturity hypothesis of Grullon et al. (2002), 
stating that dividend increases are associated with lower firm risk. We predict a negative 
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relationship between dividends and risk, Risk, which we measure by the volatility of the firm’s 
sales revenue over the past seven years. 
Grullon et al. (2002) argue that risk decreases and operations mature as the firm becomes larger 
and older. These changes may produce higher dividends. Fama and French (2001) find that large 
firms are more likely to pay dividends. Thus, we expect that dividends relate positively to the 
firm’s size and age. These two determinants, Size and Age, are measured by the log of sales and 
by the log of the number of years since the firm was founded, respectively. Finally, we control 
for industry effects by adding dummy variables reflecting whether the firm is in agriculture, 
construction, retail, transport, real estate, or services. This classification is based on the official 
Norwegian industry codes. 
We estimate (1) on the sample of all firms, i.e., both payers and non-payers. Just like the firms 
that pay dividends, those that choose not to pay represent one particular way of handling the 
potential stockholder conflict. For instance, the more nonpayers (i.e., firms with very low 
payout) there are around 50% ownership concentration compared to 90%, the more the data 
would support the outcome model. Therefore, we also estimate a payout propensity model as a 
robustness test, where the dependent variable is whether or not the firm pays a dividend. The 
independent variables in that model are identical to those used in (1). 
Table 2 reports summary statistics. On average, about one fourth of the firms pay dividends in a 
given year. The mean payout ratio is 20% for the sample as a whole and 75% for the payers. As 
in recent samples of public US companies (Fama and French (2001)), the median firm does not 
pay dividends. The largest equity holding in a majority-owned firm is on average 61% when 
every owner is a separate unit, 67% if persons are assigned to nuclear families, and 72% when 
we use the wide family definition of the base case.  There is one family member holding a 
majority stake in the firm in almost four out of five cases, and the average minority concentration 
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outside the family is high as reflected by a Herfindahl index of 0.86. Every variable in table 2 is 
stable over time.13 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
III. Statistical tests 
Table 3 shows that, except for some of the proxies for stockholder conflicts, the correlation 
between the independent variables in (1) is generally low. Thus, multicollinearity will not be a 
problem in the regressions. Notice also that the correlation coefficient between the share of the 
largest family under the wide and the narrow definition is only 0.55. Thus, it may be important to 
check whether the results are sensitive to the way stockholder conflicts are measured.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
We report univariate results for the relationship between ownership concentration and dividends 
in section A below. The findings for model (1) in the base case are presented in section B, while 
section C analyzes the effect of modeling the potential stockholder conflict in alternative ways. 
 
A. Ownership concentration and dividends 
The two key variables for testing the outcome model vs. the substitute model are the payout ratio 
and the size of the largest equity block. As an initial check, we compare the payout ratios for two 
groups. The first group consists of firms where the controlling block is above 50%, but below 
60%. The second holds firms where the controlling block is above 90%, but below 99%. These 
two groups capture the firms with the largest vs. the smallest potential for stockholder conflicts.  
Table 4 compares the payout ratios for the two groups year by year, for the pooled sample (All 
years), and for the subsample of firms with positive dividends (Payers). The table shows that the 
                                                 
13 The mean and median sales in the sample firms are $2 and $1 mill, respectively. Five percent of the firms have 
sales below $0.1 mill., while five percent sell more than $10 mill. The highest sales figure is $60 mill. in the 
winsorized sample and $1.4 bill. in the unwinsorized sample. 
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low-concentration firms have consistently and significantly higher payout than the high-
concentration firms. The average payout ratio for all firms is around 20%, while the difference 
between the two groups is fairly stable at around 6-8%. For the subsample of dividend payers, 
where the average payout ratio is around 70%, the average difference in payout between the low- 
and high-concentration subsamples exceeds 9 percentage points.14 These univariate results are 
consistent with the substitute hypothesis and inconsistent with the outcome hypothesis. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
B. The base case  
Table 5 shows the base-case estimates. We report the findings year by year, for the pooled 
sample, and for the Fama-MacBeth approach constructed from the year-by-year estimates (Fama 
and MacBeth (1973)). 
The year-by-year estimates reflect a very stable relationship between dividends and potential 
dividend determinants. Hence, these estimates are very similar to those based on the pooled 
sample (All) as well as the Fama-MacBeth (FMB) approach. Since this stability prevails in every 
subsequent analysis, we only report the Fama-MacBeth estimates in the following. The annual 
estimates are available upon request. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
The table documents an inverse relationship between dividend payout (dividends to earnings) 
and ownership concentration (the ultimate holding of the largest owner, which is either a family, 
a financial firm or a foreigner). Thus, majority-held firms tend to pay lower dividends as the cash 
flow right of the controlling stockholder increases. This result is at odds with the outcome model 
(opportunistic behavior), but supports the substitute model (non-opportunistic behavior). Hence, 
                                                 
14 We use both the t- and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests to examine the differences between the two groups. The 
latter test has the advantage of not requiring the normality assumption. It confirms the result form the t tests that of a 
statistically significant difference between the distributions of payout across the two groups. 
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the data is consistent with the notion that the controlling stockholder uses dividend policy to 
mitigate rather than to amplify the potential agency conflict with fellow stockholders that is 
inherent in the firm’s ownership structure. Such behavior may be rationalized by the economic 
incentive to build reputation for loyalty and trust among minority stockholders. 
The relationship between the dividend payout and the control variables is largely as predicted. 
For a given ownership structure, higher dividends per unit of earnings are paid by larger firms 
and by firms with higher cash holdings, higher profitability, and lower risk. The firm’s age and 
past sales growth are mostly insignificant. 
Hence, the relationship between ownership concentration and dividend payout in (1) is negative 
and statistically significant. The economic significance is moderate. To illustrate, suppose 
ownership concentration increases from its mean value of 72% by one standard deviation (14%) 
to a level of 86%. Then, the expected payout ratio decreases by around 2 percentage points, or by 
around 6% of its own standard deviation. The size of the dividend drop is not critical for our 
story, however, as even an insignificant relationship is consistent with the substitute model. 
Interestingly, Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) predict that the dividend effect of changes in 
ownership concentration is likely to be smaller in countries with better investor protection. 
Finally, the Fama–MacBeth results from table 5 are confirmed when we control for non-
observable dividend determinants by using panel estimation methods in table 6. We run 
regressions with fixed industry effects, and with random industry effects, random firm effects, 
and random firm and year effects.15 The results correspond to those in table 5 regardless of how 
we account for unobservables. Once again we find a negative and significant relationship 
between dividend payout and the cash flow rights of the majority stockholder. The control 
variables enter like in the base case.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
                                                 
15 Since the ownership structure is quite persistent at the firm level, we choose random effects rather than fixed 
effects to account for firm-specific non-observables.  
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Overall, the estimates of the base-case model show that the relationship between dividend payout 
and the controlling stockholder’s stake is inverse and stable. This result supports the substitute 
model, which predicts that the relationship between ownership concentration and dividends in 
majority-held firms is negative or flat. 
 
C. Ownership structure 
The base-case estimates in table 5 measures potential conflicts among the owners by the largest 
equity fraction held by an extended family, a financial institution or a foreigner. Since our data 
set allows for a considerably deeper analysis of how ownership structure and dividends interact, 
we first consider the effect of using alternative proxies for family control. Subsequently, we 
analyze the dividend impact of the power exerted by the minority stockholders as a group. 
Families represent a dominant majority stockholder type in our sample. The base-case definition 
of a family is quite wide, as it includes relationships by blood and marriage up to the fourth 
degree of kinship. A more narrow measure is what we call the nuclear family, which we define 
as parents and underage children. Both family definitions have advantages and limitations. The 
nuclear family abstracts from possibly strong relationships in the wider family, while the wide 
definition may overestimate the strength of distant ties. We have a preference for the wide 
definition, however, since it allows us to more clearly separate agency issues within a family as 
opposed to between families. 
Although table 3 showed that the nuclear family proxy is not strongly related to the base case 
measure, model I in table 7 documents that the nuclear family definition produces estimates that 
are very close to those under the base case in table 5.16 Thus, the tightness of the family 
definition is not driving our results. Similarly, model II shows that if we hold on to the wide 
family definition and only study the subsample of firms controlled by families, the same results 
                                                 
16 Like in the base case, we restrict the attention to firms where the controlling stake is above 50% and below 99%. 
The more narrow definition of a family makes the upper bound less restrictive and generates a larger sample. Using 
the base-case sample produces similar results.  
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prevail. Model III considers the case where one individual in the family has enough stock to 
form a majority alone. We find that payout is higher, suggesting that a minority-friendly 
dividend policy is more likely when extracting private benefits would not require the formation 
of a coalition within the family.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
Model IV ignores family as a decision-making unit and measures ownership concentration based 
on separate holdings per personal owner. This means that while a family with five owning 
members represents one single owner in table 5, they are five different owners in model IV. 
Nevertheless, the base-case results are unchanged. Thus, the data is consistent with the substitute 
model independently of whether and how we account for family relationships. 
 The corporate governance literature tends to find a non-linear relationship between ownership 
concentration and performance (Becht et al. (2003)). Model V examines this possibility for the 
dividend setting by adding a dummy variable which is 1 of the largest owner has at least two 
thirds of the equity (super majority) and zero otherwise.17 There is some evidence of a convex 
relationship, as the negative slope gets less pronounced when concentration grows. However, the 
slope remains negative, and the intercept is lower as measured by the coefficient of the 
supermajority dummy.  
The ability of the largest stockholder to extract private benefits may depend not just on the equity 
fraction, but also on the structure of the minority stakes. If minority stockholders are fragmented, 
they may find it more difficult to monitor, coordinate, and put pressure on the majority (Pagano 
and Roëll (1998)). Correspondingly, it may be more tempting for the majority to exploit the 
minority. We use several proxies of aggregate minority power to explore this possibility. 
                                                 
17The two-thirds majority allows the largest owner to amend the company charter without the consent of minority 
shareholders. 
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The Herfindahl index of minority holdings in model VI reflects the fragmentation among 
minority stockholders as a group. The estimates show that its coefficient is negative. Hence, the 
more diffuse the minority as a group, the higher payout they receive per unit of earnings. Just 
like a low Herfindahl index, a high discrepancy between the equity fraction held by the largest 
and the second largest owner may reflect higher potential for expropriation (Laeven and Levine 
(2008)). We include this measure of minority power in model VII and find that a higher gap, 
which means a potentially weaker minority, is associated with higher payout. Hence, models VI 
and VII both support the substitute hypothesis. 
Many of our sample firms have just a few owners. Therefore, one may wonder whether the 
outcome model receives no empirical support because a few people with strong personal ties 
own a large portion of the firm. In that case, the potential stockholder conflict may be disciplined 
by social rather than economic relationships (Franks et al. (2009)). Although we lack data on 
personal ties outside the family, we may explore this conjecture indirectly through the dividend 
impact of few vs. many owners in the firm. Model VIII controls for the number of owners, while 
model IX only uses the subsample of firms with three owners or more. The base-case results 
persist in both models. 
Minority stockholders are not always on the board. This occurs in about 60% of our sample 
firms. Such board absence may be to the minority’s disadvantage under the outcome model, 
since representation would have provided the minority with better tools to discipline the 
controlling majority towards consuming less private benefits. The dummy variable for minority 
directors in model X has a negative coefficient. This result is in line with the substitute model, 
since payout is higher the weaker the minority.18 
                                                 
18About 23% of our sample firms are controlled through at least one intermediary, but only 2% have more than one 
level. Although we do not focus on business groups, the potentially higher gap between cash flow rights and control 
rights in pyramids may produce higher incentives and ability to expropriate the minority. We explore this possibility 
by estimating the base-case model for subsamples where control is either achieved through direct ownership or by at 
least one level of indirect ownership, respectively. The estimates do not differ materially. This also happens when 
we use the small subsample where it takes at least two levels of indirect ownership to achieve control. 
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Summing up, we find that regardless of how we define the largest stockholder, the base case 
results from section B survive. This is also true when we account for the internal structure of the 
family, ignore family relationships altogether, and when we account for the composition of 
minority stockholders as a group. The tendency to pay higher dividends increases when the 
majority faces a diffuse minority block, a minority block not represented on the board, or a 
minority which is much smaller than the controlling block. Overall, these results are consistent 
with the hypothesis that dividends mitigate potential conflicts between stockholders that are 
created by the firm’s ownership structure. 
 
IV. Robustness 
The findings in section III support the substitute model. However, one may worry that the 
diversion of a jointly owned cash flow for private benefits induces the controlling stockholder to 
underreport the earnings in order to inflate the classic payout ratio we have used so far. Such a 
practice would bias the classic payout ratio of section III upwards in firms where the actual 
stockholder conflict is made larger by the firm’s dividend policy. Since this may bias our test 
against the outcome model, we alternatively normalize dividends by cash flow, sales, and assets 
(La Porta et al. (2000)). 
According to the three first columns of results in table 8, the negative relationship between 
ownership concentration and dividends from the base case is reproduced when we alternatively 
normalize dividends by cash flow, sales, and assets. Thus, any attempt by majority stockholders 
to manage earnings downwards in order to inflate the classic payout measure and hence hide 
private benefits does not materially bias our major result in the base case.  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
The proxy for financial constraints is not statistically significant in the base case. Model IV of 
table 8 uses asset turnover (sales to assets) rather than past sales growth as a proxy. The idea is 
that firms generating high sales with their existing assets may have a higher need to invest, 
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which may make them more financially constrained. The estimates show that the basic 
relationship between ownership concentration and dividends is upheld. Moreover, like in table 5, 
financial constraints have no material effect on dividend payout.  
We use the interest coverage ratio to measure of financial constraints in model V. Firms with low 
earnings relative to their interest payments could be prevented from paying high dividends due to 
a bank covenant or a lack of cash. Using this measure reduces sample size somewhat, since we 
examine only levered firms. The results indicate that higher interest coverage is indeed 
associated with higher dividend payments. Reassuringly, the dividend effect of the ownership 
structure and the remaining control variables is unaltered. 
DeAngelo et al. (2006) show that dividend payments are related to the ratio between total 
retained earnings and total equity. The idea is that more mature firms with low growth 
opportunities and high profitability should make high cash distributions to their owners. We add 
their measure of payout capacity to our set of controls in model VI and find that it has the 
anticipated positive sign and that it does not alter the role of the other determinants. 
Not paying dividends is as relevant as paying for the relationship between dividend policy and 
agency costs. Therefore, our regressions have so far included both dividend payers and non-
payers. Still, the relationship between stockholder conflicts and dividends may be different in the 
two groups. Moreover, table 2 showed that most firms in our sample do not pay dividends. 
Therefore, model VII reestimates the base-case model on the subsample of dividend payers. The 
estimates show that just like for the full sample, there is an inverse relationship between 
ownership concentration and dividends. The same result turns up in model VIII, where we 
estimate a logit model in which the dependent variable is whether or not the firm pays a 
dividend. The independent variables in this payout propensity model are identical to those using 
the fraction paid as the dependent variable.19 
                                                 
19Considering the large number of firm years with zero dividends, we have also estimated a Tobit model. The results 
are very similar to those of model VIII. 
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Stock repurchases have become an important form of payout for large US firms (Grullon and 
Michaely (2002)). However, repurchases were not allowed in Norway until 1999, and they are 
still rare events in private firms. We construct a measure of repurchases from the firm’s equity 
accounts and re-estimate the basic model on the firms that do not show evidence of repurchase 
activity. This restriction reduces sample size only slightly, reflecting the low repurchase 
propensity. The estimates confirm the secondary role of repurchases as a payout mechanism, as 
the results for the non-repurchasing subsample in model IX are basically identical to those for 
the full sample. 
Whereas dividends received by personal investors are taxable, intercorporate dividends are tax 
free until they are paid out to personal investors. This asymmetry may induce lower payout by 
firms with a higher proportion of their stock held directly by persons. Model X accounts for the 
proportion of personal shareholders owning stock directly, and who must hence pay tax on their 
received dividends. While there is indeed a small, negative effect on payout, the relationship 
between payout and the potential seriousness of the stockholder conflict remains unchanged. 
Overall, these robustness tests in this section show that the inverse relationship between 
ownership concentration and dividend payout is insensitive to how we normalize dividend 
payout, measure financial constraints, take account of non-payers and stock repurchases, whether 
we predict the propensity to pay dividends or the amount paid, and whether or not the dividend 
payout triggers stockholder taxes. 
 
V. Reputation 
The findings so far reflect a robust, positive relationship between dividend payout and the 
potential for stockholder conflicts. One possible explanation why majority stockholders abstain 
from exploiting their fellow investors is that the institutional framework discourages 
opportunistic behavior. However, since strong institutions can never eliminate the potential for 
agency costs, there may still be room for voluntary discipline in payout policy. In particular, one 
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may observe that controlling stockholders who anticipate the need for sustained equity 
investment in their firm will find it in their best interest to establish a record for treating minority 
investors fairly. Along similar lines, Gomes (2000) models managerial reputation effects in the 
context of IPOs and potential cash flow diversion. 
If reputation concerns are important, one should observe more minority-friendly dividend payout 
in firms that anticipate the need for new minority investment. Therefore, we relate dividend 
policy to subsequent equity investment in order to analyze the relevance of the reputation 
channel from stockholder conflicts to dividend payout. If we find that the revealed need for 
financing is linked to previous minority-friendly payout, it would be further evidence that agency 
concerns matter for cross-sectional differences in payout policy even in minority-protective legal 
environments (Michaely and Roberts (2012)). 
Our sampling procedure follows the firm over several years. We look for measures of new 
minority  investment in the firm during the later part of the sample period, linking that 
investment to the firm’s dividend policy during the preceding years. We use three alternative 
proxies for reputation concerns. The first is based on the main incentive for building reputation, 
which is getting additional minority investment. We construct a dummy variable which is equal 
to 1 if the share of the largest stockholder in 2010 is lower than in 2009, and the firm’s new paid-
in capital is at least as high as in the previous year. This proxy indicates additional investment in 
the firm by at least one minority stockholder. The second  proxy captures a change in the identity 
of minority stockholders. The idea is that minority investors may need to see a satisfactory 
dividend track record before they are willing to invest. We use a dummy variable that is 1 if a 
new minority investor enters the firm in 2010 and 0 otherwise. Our third reputation proxy is a 
composite measure which is 1 if either paid-in capital is stable or increases, the share of the 
controlling stockholder drops, or at least one new minority investor enters the firm. If none of 
these conditions are met, the variable is 0. The idea is to capture different determinants of the 
demand for minority equity investment in one single measure.  
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All three proxies for reputation incentives are conditional on the firm having the same 
controlling owner throughout the sample period. We add this restriction because we want to 
measure incentives for building minority-friendly reputation which the majority stockholder may 
need time to establish. The persistent majority stockholder criterion includes 2010, since we are 
not interested in cases where the majority envisions sale of the controlling stake. 
We have shown repeatedly that the expected payout is higher when the majority stake is closer to 
50% than when the stake is higher. This finding may reflect that controlling stockholders facing 
more severe agency problems try to mitigate them by paying higher dividends. If this policy is 
successful, the minority would be at least as active at low controlling stakes  at very high ones. 
Along the same lines as in table 4, we compare minority investment activity across majority-
controlled firms where ownership concentration is low (50-60%) vs. high (90-99%). Since we 
want to link ex ante concentration to ex post minority investment, the size of the controlling 
block is measured as an average from 2006 through 2009. As shown by the bottom row of table 
9, the size of the two groups is quite similar. We compare the proportion of firms in each group 
in 2010 that get either additional minority investment, new minority investors, or both. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
Table 9 shows that the low-concentration group is significantly more likely to attract minority 
investment than the high-concentration group.20 One quarter of the firms in the former group 
record some type of minority investment, compared to around one tenth in the latter. Therefore, 
firms facing the largest potential agency problems between majority and minority stockholders 
pay higher dividends (table 4) and are also likely to receive more minority investment than other 
firms (table 9).  
                                                 
20 We use both the Chi2 and the Fisher exact test to compare the proportions for the two groups. The Fisher test is 
more rigorous for small proportions. The limit is typically set at 5%, which is close to the proportion for the high-
concentration group in our sample. 
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Two different univariate analyses have shown that lower ownership stakes in majority-controlled 
firms are associated with both higher dividend payout and higher minority investment. In the 
next step, we examine the direct relationship between ex ante dividend payout and ex post 
minority investment in a multivariate setting. We first regress the dividend payout ratio on the 
control variables in the base-case model (1), which are liquidity, profitability, financial 
con ntstrai s, risk, size, age, and industry: 
(2) ܦ݅ݒ௜௧ ൌ  ߙ ൅ ߚଵܮ݅ݍ௜௧ ൅ ߚଶܲݎ݋௜௧ ൅ ߚଷܨ݅݊௜௧ ൅ ߚସܴ݅ݏ݇௜௧ ൅ ߚହܵ݅ݖ݁௜௧ ൅ ߚ଺ܣ݃݁௜௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧ 
We run cross-sectional regressions of (2) for the first four years (2006-2009) of the five-year 
sample period. Next, we collect residuals from (2), i.e., the unexplained part of dividend payout, 
and take the average of the εit values for each firm i over the four years. This average residual 
payout is then regressed on variables that are supposed to reflect the firm’s reputation incentives 
as m pl a 1 e e  easured in the final sam e ye r (20 0). Th mod l is:
(3) ܴ݁ݏܦ݅ݒ௜ ൌ  ߛ ൅  ߠଵ ܥ݋݊௜௧ ൅ ߠଶ ܥ݋݊௜௧ · ܴ݁݌௜௧ ൅ ߠଷ ܴ݁݌௜௧ ൅ ߴ௜௧, 
where Rep is a measure of reputation incentives in 2010, and Con is average ownership 
concentration measured over 2006-2009.  
Table 10 shows the estimates of (3) under the three alternative proxies for reputation incentives 
we used in table 9. The coefficient on ownership concentration taken separately is negative and 
significant, as usual. The interaction terms show that this inverse relationship is even stronger for 
firms that may be incentivized by reputation concerns. Also, the intercept is higher, reflecting a 
higher dividend level in general when reputation concerns are prevalent. 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
These findings imply that the substitute-type association between dividend payout and the share 
of the controlling owner is more pronounced in firms with stronger reputation incentives. This 
relationship holds regardless of whether we measure these incentives by the arrival of new 
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minority investors, a lower  majority share, or a combination of the two. The finding supports the 
hypothesis that firms pay high dividends in order to maintain high and renewed minority 
investment. Such a dividend policy may produce value by reducing the firm’s cost of capital. 
 We find this evidence of majority stockholder reputation effects on dividend policy in a country 
with strong minority protection. Thus, strong legal protection of minority rights and incentives to 
invest in reputation for treating co-investors well are not necessarily alternative ways of reducing 
agency costs. Given the earlier cross-country results in favor of the outcome model, our findings 
point to the need for future research on the relationship between formal and informal vehicles for 
protecting minority investors. 
 
VI. Conclusions 
The relationship between stockholder conflicts and dividend policy within a given legal regime 
has barely been addressed in the empirical literature. We study this relationship in an empirical 
setting with neutral dividend taxation and strong legal protection of minority stockholder rights. 
Our main conclusion is that market forces incentivize controlling stockholders to treat the 
minority well even in minority-friendly legal environments. We find that the higher the potential 
for conflicts among the stockholders, the more of the firm’s earnings is paid out as dividends. 
This relationship holds regardless of how we measure conflict potential and dividend payout. 
Thus, majority stockholders use dividends to reduce agency costs rather than to increase them by 
opportunistic payout behavior. We also find that this behavior is consistent with an incentive to 
build valuable future reputation by the current dividend policy. 
This result contrasts with earlier evidence on dividend policy differences across different legal 
regimes, supporting the idea that stockholders behave opportunistically when the law allows for 
it (La Porta et al. (2000)). Our findings suggest that within a legal regime where minority 
stockholders are well protected by the regulator, the majority stockholders find it in their own 
interest to voluntarily abstain from opportunistic behavior and instead use dividend policy to 
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reduce agency conflicts. This evidence also supports the argument by Michaely and Roberts 
(2012) that ownership characteristics and incentives are important determinants of the firm’s 
dividend policy. 
The rationale for the payout behavior we observe may be the need to issue new equity to 
minority investors in the future. We find that a less opportunistic dividend policy is indeed 
associated with higher minority equity investment later on. Reputation incentives for the 
individual firm may therefore complement minority-friendly regulation for all firms. This 
relationship suggests that the reduction of agency problems based on market mechanisms rather 
than institutions is a useful perspective on how firms make their dividend decisions. 
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Table 1: Population, filters, and sample
Year
2006 2,470 9,873 9,873 40,827 62,855 68,131 69,629 116,133 157 890 180,543
2007 3,075 10,185 10,185 40,148 62,073 67,215 68,662 126,097 167,539 191,827
2008 2,502 9,940 9,940 40,547 62,669 67,908 69,427 128,397 172,030 197,813
2009 2,406 9,638 9,638 40,830 63,819 69,267 70,738 129,391 173,574 200,038
2010 2,342 8,744 8,744 38,674 61,975 67,071 68,455 125,336 169,948 194,724
Subsidiary Population
This table shows the effect of applying successive sampling filters. We start from the large group of limited liability private companies in Norway to
the very right in the table (Population). We then impose successive filters moving towards the left that exclude financials (Financial firm), firms that
are majority held in a business group (Subsidiary), firms with zero sales, assets or employment (No activity), and firms with suspect accounting
figures (Inconsistent data). We filter out the smallest 5% of firms in terms of assets, sales, and employees (Small size), and we only include firms with
a controlling stockholder (No majority owner). A stockholder can also be a family with several owning members, but we exclude firms with just one
stockholder (Single owner). These filters jointly produce our basic sample (Sample, all). Finally, we ignore the non-dividend paying firms and show
the number of firms with positive dividends (Sample, payers).
Sample, 
payers
Sample, 
all 
Single 
owner No activity
 No majority 
owner
Financial 
firm
Inconsistent 
dataSmall size
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Characteristic 
Dividend propensity 0.250 (0.000) 0.302 (0.000) 0.252 (0.000) 0.250 (0.000) 0.268 (0.000) 0.264 (0.000) 1.000 (1.000)
Dividends to earnings 0.189 (0.000) 0.223 (0.000) 0.183 (0.000) 0.194 (0.000) 0.216 (0.000) 0.201 (0.000) 0.754 (0.774)
Dividends to sales 0.022 (0.000) 0.025 (0.000) 0.036 (0.000) 0.019 (0.000) 0.021 (0.000) 0.021 (0.000) 0.078 (0.054)
Dividends to cash flow 0.290 (0.000) 0.339 (0.000) 0.264 (0.000) 0.244 (0.000) 0.295 (0.000) 0.287 (0.000) 1.260 (0.909)
Dividends to assets 0.037 (0.000) 0.045 (0.000) 0.036 (0.000) 0.034 (0.000) 0.036 (0.000) 0.038 (0.000) 0.142 (0.112)
Holding of largest owner, incl. 
extended family 0.706 (0.660) 0.721 (0.682) 0.725 (0.700) 0.726 (0.700) 0.728 (0.700) 0.724 (0.693) 0.715 (0.689)
Holding of largest owner, incl. 
nuclear family 0.653 (0.650) 0.629 (0.637) 0.630 (0.633) 0.630 (0.626) 0.633 (0.630) 0.668 (0.667) 0.627 (0.625)
Holdings of largest owner, incl. 
separate owners 0.641 (0.650) 0.609 (0.600) 0.608 (0.600) 0.609 (0.600) 0.611 (0.600) 0.609 (0.600) 0.609 (0.600)
Majority owner in largest family 0.845 (1.000) 0.758 (1.000) 0.749 (1.000) 0.747 (1.000) 0.749 (1.000) 0.770 (1.000) 0.770 (1.000)
Minority concentration 0.872 (1.000) 0.860 (1.000) 0.853 (1.000) 0.846 (1.000) 0.843 (1.000) 0.856 (1.000) 0.839 (1.000)
Minority on board 0.346 (0.000) 0.410 (0.000) 0.403 (0.000) 0.410 (0.000) 0.417 (0.000) 0.397 (0.000) 0.415 (0.000)
Liquidity 0.260 (0.191) 0.264 (0.202) 0.262 (0.195) 0.265 (0.198) 0.269 (0.206) 0.264 (0.198) 0.347 (0.320)
Profitability 0.098 (0.090) 0.102 (0.099) 0.078 (0.081) 0.063 (0.067) 0.067 (0.066) 0.082 (0.081) 0.196 (0.175)
Financial constraints 0.123 (0.081) 0.136 (0.100) 0.146 (0.096) 0.107 (0.066) 0.081 (0.042) 0.121 (0.077) 0.148 (0.101)
Risk 0.339 (0.233) 0.335 (0.233) 0.328 (0.226) 0.325 (0.230) 0.315 (0.223) 0.329 (0.229) 0.267 (0.189)
Size 14.671 (5.229) 18.164 (6.542) 18.931 (6.846) 17.559 (6.644) 18.080 (6.933) 17.473 (6.413) 22.344 (10.991)
Age 16 412 (13 000) 16 188 (13 000) 16 596 (13 500) 16 923 (14 000) 17 366 (14 000) 16 677 (14 000) 17 635 (15 000)
2006 2007 2008 2009 All Payers2010
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sample size 9,873 10,185 9,940 9,638 8,744 48,380 12,795
This table shows the mean and median (in parentheses) of variables used in the empirical analysis. Dividend propensity is the fraction of firms paying dividends, and Dividends is
cash dividends paid to stockholders. Earnings are bottom-line profits, Sales is total sales revenue, Cash flow is cash flow from operations after taxes, and Assets is the total of balance
sheet assets. Largest owner is the equity fraction held by the largest stockholder, which may be a financial firm, a foreigner or a family whose owning members are related by blood or
marriage. Extended family is the aggregate equity fraction of the largest family by ownership, based on blood or marriage up to the fourth degree of kinship. Nuclear family is a unit
where kinship is limited to spouses and underage children, and Separate owners reflects that no personal owner is assigned to a family. Majority owner in largest family is 1 if the
largest family by ownership has an owner with a share above 50% and zero otherwise. Minority concentration is the Herfindahl index for all but the largest owner, where a family
counts as one owner. Minority on board is 1 if minority stockholders are represented on the board and 0 otherwise. Liquidity is cash holdings divided by assets, Profitability is
operating profit after taxes divided by assets (ROA), and Financial constraints is measured as average sales growth over the past three years. Risk is the standard deviation of sales
growth over the past seven but minimum three years. Size is sales in million NOK, and Age is the number of years since the firm was founded. The sample is all private firms with a
majority stockholder, consistent accounting figures, and positive sales, employment, and assets. We ignore subsidiaries, financials, single-owner firms, the smallest 5% firms by
assets, sales, and employees, and firms where the government holds a majority stake. The payout ratio is winsorized at the 98% tail, while Liquidity, Profitability, Financial
constraints, and Risk are winsorized at the 0.5% and 99.5% tails.
Table 3: Correlations
Holding of largest owner, incl. 
extended family -0.04
Holding of largest owner, incl. 
nuclear family -0.02 0.55
Holding of largest owner, incl. 
separate owners -0.02 0.49 0.92
Majority owner in largest family 0.02 -0.01 0.61 0.73
Minority concentration -0.02 0.27 0.14 0.12 -0.01
Minority on board 0.03 -0.25 -0.06 -0.04 0.08 -0.06
Liquidity 0.24 -0.04 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.05
Profitability 0.37 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.24
Financial constraints 0.04 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 0.14
Risk -0.14 -0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.11 0.31
Si 0 21 0 00 0 09 0 04 0 07 0 15 0 07 0 19 0 16 0 02 0 23
Minority 
concen-
tration Liquidity Profitability
Financial 
constraints Risk Size
Dividends 
to 
earnings
Holding 
of largest 
owner
Holding of 
largest nuclear 
family
Majority 
owner in 
largest 
family
Minority 
on board
Holding of 
largest 
separate 
owner
ze . . - . - . - . - . - . - . . . - .
Age 0.05 0.13 -0.01 -0.01 -0.07 0.02 -0.13 -0.04 0.02 -0.19 -0.27 0.11
This table shows the Pearson bivariate coefficients of correlation for pairs of key variables used in the empirical analysis. Largest owner is the equity fraction held by the
largest stockholder, which may be a financial firm, a foreigner or a family whose owning members are related by blood or marriage. Extended family is the aggregate equity
fraction of the largest family by ownership, based on blood or marriage up to the fourth degree of kinship. Nuclear family is a unit where kinship is limited to spouses and
underage children, and Separate owners reflects that no personal owner is assigned to a family. Majority owner in largest family is 1 if the largest family by ownership has
an owner with share above 50% and zero otherwise. Minority concentration is the Herfindahl index for all but the largest owner, where a family counts as one owner.
Minority on board is 1 if minority shareholders are represented on the board and 0 otherwise. Liquidity is cash holdings to assets, Profitability is operating profit after taxes
divided by assets (ROA), and Financial constraints is average sales growth over the past three years. Risk is the standard deviation of sales growth over the past seven but
minimum three years. Size is the log of sales in million NOK, and Age is the log of the number of years since the firm was founded. The sample is all private firms with a
majority stockholder, consistent accounting figures, and positive sales, employment, and assets over the 2006-2010 period. We ignore subsidiaries, financials, single-owner
firms, the smallest 5% firms by assets, sales, and employees, and firms where the government holds a majority stake. The payout ratio is winsorized at the 98% tail.
Liquidity, Profitability, Financial constraints, and Risk are winsorized at the 0.5% and 99.5% tails.
Table 4: Dividends and ownership concentration
 
Year
2006 0.057 (0.000) (0.000)
2007 0.057 (0.000) (0.000)
2008 0.074 (0.000) (0.000)
2009 0.083 (0.000) (0.000)
2010 0.073 (0.000) (0.001)
All years 0.069 (0.000) (0.000)
Payers 0.093 (0.000) (0.000)
This table shows the average dividend to earnings ratio for two ownership concentration groups (Group 1 and Group
2). The controlling stockholder in Group 1 has more than 50% but less than 60% of the firm's stock. In Group 2, the
largest stockholder owns between 90% and 99%. The largest stockholder may be a financial firm, a foreigner or a
family whose owning members are related by blood or marriage up to the fourth degree of kinship. We report the mean
payout ratio for the two groups year by year, for the pooled sample (All years) and for the subsample of firms with
positive dividends (Payers). We also compute the difference between the averages, and we test for their equality using
the t-test and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test. The p-values are shown in parentheses. The sample is all private firms
with a majority stockholder, consistent accounting figures, and positive sales, employment, and assets. We ignore
b idi i fi i l i l fi th ll t 5% fi b t l d l d fi h th
0.215
0.246
0.217
0.234
0.236
0.230
0.766
0.158
0.189
0.143
0.151
0.163
0.161
0.673
p-value,  
t test     
p-value, 
Wilcoxon test
Group 1: Largest owner 
has 50-60%
Group 2: Largest owner 
has 90-99%
Group 1 less 
Group 2
su s ar es, nanc a s, s ng e-owner rms, e sma es rms y asse s, sa es, an emp oyees, an rms w ere e
government holds a majority stake. The distribution of the payout ratios is winsorized at the 98% tail.
Table 5: The base-case regression
Independent variable
Ownership concentration -0.167 (0.000) -0.180 (0.000) -0.165 (0.000) -0.206 (0.000) -0.173 (0.000) -0.179 (0.000) -0.178 (0.000)
Liquidity 0.162 (0.000) 0.202 (0.000) 0.239 (0.000) 0.280 (0.000) 0.285 (0.000) 0.234 (0.000) 0.234 (0.001)
Profitability 0.491 (0.000) 0.609 (0.000) 0.494 (0.000) 0.573 (0.000) 0.680 (0.000) 0.557 (0.000) 0.569 (0.000)
Financial constraints -0.011 (0.454) 0.004 (0.796) -0.012 (0.399) 0.003 (0.833) -0.037 (0.029) -0.007 (0.295) -0.006 (0.516)
Risk -0.124 (0.000) -0.132 (0.000) -0.111 (0.000) -0.089 (0.000) -0.106 (0.000) -0.117 (0.000) -0.112 (0.000)
Size 0.021 (0.000) 0.022 (0.000) 0.018 (0.000) 0.016 (0.000) 0.014 (0.000) 0.018 (0.000) 0.018 (0.001)
Age -0.029 (0.001) -0.022 (0.000) -0.015 (0.012) -0.003 (0.636) 0.010 (0.177) -0.011 (0.001) -0.010 (0.229)
R2 0.297 0.362 0.330 0.327 0.336 0.328 0.328
Sample size 9,786 10,058 9,751 9,446 8,618 47,659 47,659
This table reports the estimates for the base-case regressions of model (1) in the main text. The p-values are shown in parentheses. The dependent variable is cash dividends
divided by earnings. Ownership concentration is the largest equity stake in the firm held by a financial firm, a foreigner, or a family with owning members related by blood or
marriage up to the fourth degree of kinship. Liquidity is cash holdings to assets, Profitability is operating profit after taxes over total assets (ROA), and Financial constraints is
measured as average sales growth over the past three years. Risk is the standard deviation of sales growth over the past seven but minimum three years. Size is the log of sales in
million NOK, and Age is the log of the number of years since the firm was founded. The sample is all private firms with a majority stockholder, consistent accounting figures,
and positive sales, employment, and assets. We ignore subsidiaries, financials, single-owner firms, the smallest 5% firms by assets, sales, and employees, and firms where the
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tails. We control for the firm's industry (not reported). The table reports the estimates of the year-by-year OLS regressions, the pooled sample OLS regression (All), and the Fama
MacBeth (FMB) regressions with the adjusted R2 and the sample size from the pooled regression.
Table 6: The base-case model estimated with panel methods
I II III IV
Ownership concentration -0.094 -0.099 -0.077 -0.082
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011)
Liquidity 0.276 0.284 0.274 0.277
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Profitability 0.525 0.541 0.341 0.337
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Financial constraints -0.026 -0.010 -0.001 -0.010
(0.013) (0.404) (0.870) (0.525)
Risk -0.070 -0.057 -0.057 -0.064
(0.010) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001)
Size 0.045 0.039 0.038 0.045
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.006 0.008 0.011 0.004
(0.254) (0.328) (0.004) (0.677)
Random firm effect No No Yes Yes
Random industry effect No Yes Yes No
Fixed industry effect Yes No No No
Random year effect No No No Yes
Independent variable
Model
  
R2 0.147 0.147 0.144 0.112
Sample size 47,659 47,659 47,659 47,659
This table reports the coefficient estimates using panel data techniques to estimate model (1) of the main text. The p-values are shown
in parentheses. The dependent variable is cash dividends divided by earnings. Ownership concentration is the largest equity stake in the
firm held by a financial firm, a foreigner, or a family with owning members related by blood or marriage up to the fourth degree of
kinship. Liquidity is cash holdings to assets, Profitability is operating profit after taxes to assets (ROA), and Financial constraints is
average sales growth over the past three years. Risk is the standard deviation of sales growth over the past seven but minimum three
years. Size is the log of sales in million NOK, and Age is the log of the number of years since the firm was founded. The sample is all
private firms with a majority stockholder, consistent accounting figures, and positive sales, employment, and assets over the period
2006-2010. We ignore subsidiaries, financials, single-owner firms, the smallest 5% firms by assets, sales, and employees, and firms
where the government holds a majority stake. The payout ratio is winsorized at the 98% tail. Liquidity, Profitability, Financial
constraints, and Risk are winsorized at the 0.5% and 99.5% tails.The table reports Fama-MacBeth regression estimates with the
adjusted R2 and sample size from the pooled regression.
Table 7: Accounting for multiple owner characteristics
Independent variable
OC -0.158 (0.000) -0.177 (0.000) -0.177 (0.000) -0.162 (0.000) -0.675 (0.000) -0.143 (0.000) -0.214 (0.000) -0.176 (0.000) -0.182 (0.001) -0.180 (0.000)
Largest in family has 
majority 0.002 (0.098)
Largest exceeds 2/3 -0.328 (0.001)
Largest exceeds 2/3 * OC 0.569 (0.001)
Herfindahl index, minority -0.046 (0.011)
Largest less second largest 0.001 (0.006)
Number of owners -0.010 (0.838)
Minority is director -0.005 (0.045)
Liquidity 0.217 (0.001) 0.223 (0.001) 0.223 (0.001) 0.217 (0.000) 0.264 (0.000) 0.238 (0.000) 0.235 (0.001) 0.234 (0.001) 0.235 (0.000) 0.234 (0.001)
Profitability 0.560 (0.000) 0.573 (0.000) 0.573 (0.000) 0.550 (0.000) 0.549 (0.000) 0.591 (0.000) 0.569 (0.000) 0.570 (0.000) 0.579 (0.001) 0.569 (0.001)
Financial constraints -0.014 (0.227) -0.005 (0.593) -0.005 (0.597) -0.008 (0.324) -0.020 (0.035) -0.005 (0.608) -0.006 (0.502) -0.007 (0.486) -0.000 (0.908) -0.006 (0.475)
Risk -0.111 (0.000) -0.122 (0.000) -0.123 (0.000) -0.110 (0.000) -0.083 (0.000) -0.116 (0.000) -0.111 (0.000) -0.112 (0.000) -0.100 (0.001) -0.112 (0.000)
Size 0.017 (0.001) 0.018 (0.000) 0.018 (0.000) 0.017 (0.001) 0.033 (0.001) 0.019 (0.001) 0.019 (0.001) 0.018 (0.001) 0.018 (0.001) 0.018 (0.001)
Age -0.012 (0.135) -0.010 (0.222) -0.010 (0.225) -0.014 (0.115) 0.001 (0.943) -0.010 (0.216) -0.009 (0.259) -0.010 (0.219) -0.006 (0.197) -0.010 (0.232)
R2 0.312 0.331 0.331 0.307 0.334 0.338 0.329 0.329 0.336 0.328
Sample size 56,559 40,560 40,685 56,787 47,659 42,224 47,659 47,659 24,620 47,659
I: Nuclear     
family
IV: No family 
membership
VIII: Number of 
owners
II: Family firm 
(subsample)
VII: Largest less 
second largest
VI: Minority 
concentration
V: Super 
majority
Ownership concentration (OC) Minority power
III: Majority 
family member
IX: At least 3 
owners (subsample)
X: Minority on 
the board
This table reports the OLS regression estimates for model (1) in the main text under a wider set of ownership characteristics. The p-values are shown in parentheses. The dependent variable is cash dividends
divided by earnings. Ownership concentration (OC) is the largest equity stake in the firm held by a financial firm, a foreigner, or a family with owning members related by blood or marriage. Nuclear family is
kinship limited to spouses and underage children. Otherwise, a family is defined as a group of owning members who are related by blood or marriage up to the fourth degree of kinship. Family firm is a firm
where a family holds more than half the equity, No family membership does not assign personal stockholders to families, Largest in family has majority is 1 if the largest owner in the family has a majority, and
Largest exceeds 2/3 is 1 if one owner has super majority. Herfindahl index, minority is the sum of squared minority ownership fractions, and Largest less second largest is the difference between the two largest
equity stakes. Liquidity is cash holdings to assets, Profitability is operating profit after taxes over total assets (ROA), and Financial constraints is average sales growth over the past three years. Risk is the
standard deviation of sales growth over the past seven but minimum three years. Size is the log of sales in million NOK, and Age is the log of the number of years since the firm was founded. We control for
industry effects (not reported). The sample is all private firms with a majority stockholder, consistent accounting figures, and positive sales, employment, and assets. We ignore subsidiaries, financials, single-
owner firms, the smallest 5% firms by assets, sales, and employees, and firms where the government holds a majority stake. The payout ratio is winsorized at the 98% tail, while Liquidity, Profitability,
Financial constraints, and Risk are winsorized at the 0.5% and 99.5% tails. We report Fama MacBeth regressions for 2006-2010 with the adjusted R2 and sample size from the pooled regression.
Table 8: Robustness tests
Independent variable I: Cash flow II: Sales III: Assets
IV: Sales to 
assets
V: Interest 
coverage
VII: Payers 
only
VIII: Pay or 
not pay
IX: No 
repurchase
Ownership concentration -0.259 -0.007 -0.033 -0.178 -0.205 -0.178 -0.199 -0.319 -0.179 -0.142
(0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.028) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Liquidity 0.363 0.031 0.059 0.235 0.205 0.233 0.113 2.015 0.220 0.256
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.045) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Profitability 1.076 0.089 0.174 0.562 0.726 0.569 -0.147 7.244 0.578 0.560
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.104) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Financial constraints 0.043 0.008 -0.004 -0.001 0.001 -0.006 -0.174 -0.248 -0.008 -0.013
(0.070) (0.001) (0.067) (0.582) (0.002) (0.508) (0.000) (0.000) (0.493) (0.164)
Risk -0.169 -0.003 -0.013 -0.112 -0.148 -0.112 0.051 -1.545 -0.123 -0.106
(0.001) (0.011) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.168) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Size 0.025 0.0003 0.003 0.018 0.017 0.018 -0.044 0.513 0.018 0.018
(0.002) (0.095) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Age -0.020 0.003 -0.005 -0.00 -0.005 -0.010 -0.041 0.168 -0.010 -0.005
(0.281) (0.003) (0.014) (0.237) (0.616) (0.224) (0.023) (0.000) (0.228) (0.462)
Retained earnings to total equity 0.002
(0.001)
Direct personal ownership -0.001
(0.024)
R2 0 233 0 299 0 358 0 327 0 348 0 329 0 070 0 324 0 331 0 334
X: 
Dividends 
taxed
Dividend normalized by Financial constraints Dividend payer statusVI: 
Payout 
capacity
. . . . . . . . . .
Sample size 45,368 47,997 47,997 47,987 30,963 47,646 12,767 45,136 39,827 47,659
This table reports the estimates for modified versions of the base-case model (1) of the main text. The p-values are shown in parentheses. The dependent variable is
dividends to earnings except in models I, II, III, and VIII. Interest coverage is earnings to interest payments, Payout capacity is total retained earnings to total equity
(added as an independent variable to the base-case model), Payers only is the subsample of firms with positive dividends, Pay or not pay is a dummy variable which is 1
if the firm pays dividends and zero otherwise (logit model), while No repurchase is the subsample of firms that do not buy back their stock in the sample period.
Dividends taxed adds the fraction of direct personal ownership in the firm to the base-case model.  Ownership concentration is the largest equity stake in the firm held by 
a financial firm, a foreigner, or a family with owning members related by blood or marriage up to the fourth degree of kinship. Liquidity is cash holdings to assets,
Profitability is operating profit to assets (ROA), and Financial constraints in the base-case model is the average sales growth over the past three years. Risk is the
standard deviation of sales growth over the past seven but minimum three years. Size is the log of sales in million NOK, and Age is the log of the number of years since
the firm was founded. The base-case sample is all private firms with a majority stockholder, consistent accounting figures, and positive sales, employment, and assets.
We ignore subsidiaries, financials, single-owner firms, the smallest 5% firms by assets, sales, and employees, and firms where the government holds a majority stake.
The payout ratios are winsorized at the 98% tail, while Liquidity, Profitability, Financial constraints, and Risk are winsorized at the 0.5% and 99.5% tails.. We control
for industry effects (not reported). The table reports Fama-MacBeth regression estimates for 2006 to 2010 with the adjusted R2 and sample size from the pooled
regression.
Table 9: Ownership concentration and new minority investments
Difference
Chi2           
test, p-value
Fisher's exact test, 
p-value
Additional minority investment 0.064 0.000 0.000
New minority owner 0.095 0.000 0.000
Composite incentive 0.149 0.000 0.000
Number of observations
Group 1: Largest owner 
has 50-60%
Group 2: Largest owner 
has 90-99% 
This table shows the proportion of firms with additional minority investment, new minority owners, or at least one of these two
characteristics (composite incentive) across two ownership concentration groups (Group 1 and Group 2). The controlling stockholder in
Group 1 has more than 50% but less than 60% of the firm's equity. In Group 2, the share of the largest stockholder is between 90% and
99%. The largest stockholder may be a financial firm, a foreigner or a family whose owning members are related by blood or marriage up
to the fourth level of kinship. The share of the largest stockholder is computed as an average over 2006-2009. Additional minority
investment is a dummy variable which is 1 if the share of the largest stockholder decreases between 2009 and 2010 and paid-in capital
does not decrease. Otherwise, the variable is zero. New minority owner is a dummy variable which is 1 if a new minority investor enters
the firm in 2010 and zero otherwise. Composite incentive is 1 if either the paid-in capital is stable or increases from 2009 to 2010, the
controlling stake drops, or at least one new minority investor enters the firm. If not, the variable is zero. The table shows the average of
these dummy variables across the sample firms, which are private limited liability firms with consistent accounting figures and positive
sales employment and assets We ignore subsidiaries financials single owner firms the smallest 5% firms by assets sales and
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0.103 0.039
0.157 0.062
0.248 0.099
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employees, and firms where the government holds a majority stake. The payout ratio is winsorized at the 98% tail, while Liquidity,
Profitability, Financial constraints, and Risk are winsorized at the 0.5% and 99.5% tails.
Table 10: Reputation incentives for dividend payout
Independent variable
I: Additional minority 
investment
II: New minority 
owner
III: Composite 
incentive
Ownership concentration (OC) -0.304 -0.353 -0.307
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001)
OC · Additional minority investment -1.317
(0.004)
Additional minority investment 1.052
(0.001)
OC · New minority owner -0.510
(0.013)
New minority owner 0.574
(0.041)
OC · Composite incentive -1.394
(0.000)
Composite incentive 1.098
(0.068)
R2 0.01 0.01 0.01
Sample size 3,640 3,640 3,640
Models I-III report the OLS regression estimates for (3) in the main text. The p-values are shown in parentheses. The
dependent variable in every model is the average residual per firm from regressing dividends on the firm's liquidity,
profitability, financial constraints, risk, size, age, and industry for 2006-2009. Ownership concentration is the firm's
average largest equity stake in 2006-2009 held by a financial firm, a foreigner, or a family where individual owners are
related by blood or marriage up to the fourth degree of kinship. Additional minority investment is a dummy variable
which is 1 if the share of the largest stockholder decreases between 2009 and 2010 and paid-in capital does not
decrease. Otherwise, the variable is zero. New minority owner is a dummy variable which is 1 if a new minority investor
enters the firm in 2010 and zero otherwise. Composite incentive is 1 if either the paid-in capital is stable or increases
from 2009 to 2010, the controlling stake drops, or at least one new minority investor enters the firm. If not, the variable
is zero. The sample is all private firms with a majority stockholder, consistent accounting figures, and positive sales,
employment, and assets. We ignore subsidiaries, financials, single-owner firms, the smallest 5% firms by assets, sales or
employees, and firms where the government holds a majority stake. 
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